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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the effect of political connections versus founding family 
ownership on the relationship between disproportional ownership structure and leverage 
decisions of privately owned firms listed in Chinese market. We find that disproportional 
ownership has positive effect on leverage, indicating that controlling shareholder tends to use 
both disproportional ownership structure and debt to expropriate. We also find that the 
interacted term between disproportional ownership and political connections has a positive 
impact on leverage ratio, and disproportional ownership structure is negatively related with 
leverage ratio of founding-family controlled firms, which indicate a substitute effect between 
political connections and founding-family ownership for the impact of disproportional 
ownership on leverage ratio. Finally, we provide evidence that controlling shareholder of 
firms with disproportional ownership structure tends to use more related party loans for 
tunnelling. We argue that under China‟s weak creditor protection institutions, political 
connections of chairman or CEO provide better access to financing for private-owned firms, 
but also provide excess external resources for controlling shareholder to expropriate. 
                                                          




However, founding-family ownership can largely mitigate the tunnelling effect of controlling 
shareholder while privately controlled firms through taking-over from former State owned 
firms tends to facilitate the tunnelling effect of controlling shareholder through its political 
connections. 
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Prior researches on the effect of disproportional ownership often focus on the relationship 
between disproportional ownership structure and firm value (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; 
Maury and Pajuste, 2004; Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2006; Gompers et al., 2009). There are 
also literatures that investigate the impact of disproportional ownership on firm‟s financing 
decisions in recent years. For example, Du and Dai (2005) find that the separation between 
cash flow rights and control rights is positively associated with corporate leverage, due to the 
non-dilution entrenchment effect, by investigating a sample of nine East Asia economies 
before the Asian financial crisis in 1997; Faccio et al., (2010) find that controlling 
shareholder tends to use both pyramiding and leverage to expand the resources to facilitate 
tunnelling when the creditor protection is weak.  In addition, prior studies also indicate that 
political connections help firms‟ access to external financing resources such as bank loans, 
especially for private-owned firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 
2006). Moreover, studies also show that founding family ownership can reduce the agency 
conflicts between equity and debt claimants (Anderson et al., 2003), and founding-family 
firms perform better than nonfamily firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). However, no current 
literature links the effect of disproportional ownership structure, political connections and 
family ownership on firm‟s leverage decisions, especially their impact on tunnelling of 
controlling shareholder. Particularly, given that political connections and founding-family 
ownership may influence firms‟ access to external resources and agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholder and external investors, prior literature provide no evidence on 
whether they dampen or facilitate expropriation of ultimate controlling shareholders. In this 
paper, we attempt to link the three research areas and examine their impact on leverage and 
expropriation of controlling shareholder by using privately owned firms listed in Chinese 
capital market.  
We conduct our research using a sample of Chinese private firms for the following reasons. 
First, since the late 1970s, when Chinese government introduced the economic reforms, 
private business has advanced and grown rapidly. According to 2009 China Statistical 
Yearbook, about two third of Chinese GDP was produced by private owned firms (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Previous studies on Chinese firms often focus on  the agency 
costs of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), where the agency costs mainly stem from the 
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different objectives of the government and the firms (e.g., Lin et al., 1998; Fan et al., 2007; 
Rousseau and Xiao, 2007). It is important to investigate the agency conflicts of private-
owned firms in Chinese capital market because around the world, the proportion of publicly 
listed family firms far exceeds that of state-owned firms, as shown by La Porta et al., (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Therefore, the results from these 
privately controlled firms can not only enrich the current literature but also provide more 
relevant and comparable implication to most of other countries where private sector 
dominates their economy.  
Second, due to history reasons, private-owned firms in Chinese capital market can be 
classified into two types, which are founding-family controlled firms that are ultimately 
controlled by entrepreneurs and go public through IPOs, and non-founding-family controlled 
firms that are transformed from former SOEs and go public through mergers and acquisitions. 
It is argued that the incentive structure of founding-family firms may differs from that of non-
founding-family firms (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Stein, 1988, 1989; Burkart etal., 2002; 
Anderson et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003), so investigating the 
agency cost of Chinese private-owned firms also provide implications to see whether 
entrepreneurs or the non-entrepreneurs have higher incentive to use leverage and expropriate.  
Third, a distinct feature of China that differs with other transition economy is the continuing 
rule of the Communist Party and the continuing ideological discrimination against private 
ownership, despite the dramatic reform of the economy (Li et al., 2006). Therefore, political 
connections in China may be even more important than other countries. Previous studies also 
indicate that political connections have an important influence on firm value and performance 
(e.g., Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2010). Therefore, China 
provides a unique dataset to see the impact of political connections on tunnelling activities of 
controlling shareholders through leveraging.  
 
Forth, the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholder in Chinese private firms is more 
likely to be influenced by political connections and founding-family ownership. Political 
connections could play different role in founding-family and non-founding-family controlled 
firms. In non-founding-family controlled firms, political connections are grabbling hands of 
the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholder, this is because that 1) political 
connections help controlling shareholder of non-founding-family controlled firms to get the 
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control right over the former SOEs. Particularly, with the process of China‟s gradual reform, 
state ownership gradually retreats from some competitive industries, and a number of former 
SOEs (usually the SOEs controlled by local government) become private owned firms (non-
founding-family controlled firms) through MBO or mergers and acquisitions in recent years 
(Chow, 2007). Usually the government decides who can get the control right over the former 
SOEs, so usually the potential buyer who has political connections finally get the control 
right over the former SOEs with relatively low price. 2) Political connections in those non-
founding-family controlled firms mainly inherited from the former SOEs, this is because 
those firms are privatized through taking over from those state owned firms where they 
normally had political connected CEO from government offices. Therefore, controlling 
shareholder of non-founding-family controlled firms may have stronger incentive to 
tunnelling because they are eagle to convert the former “state assets” to “private assets”, and 
political connections facilitate this tunnelling. These tunnelling also results in a huge state 
asset losses in China in recent years, it is estimated that there are 1,400 billion Yuan state 
assets losses since the early 1980s (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission Report).Unlike the case in non-founding-family controlled firms, in founding-
family controlled firms, political connections may be newly established by recruiting some 
politically connected person for the purpose of accessing financial resources. Founding 
families may have less incentive to tunnelling because the interest of founding families are 
always align with the firms and the founding families tend to concern more about their long-
term interest in the firm (Anderson et al., 2003). In short, compared with the founding 
families, controlling shareholder of non-founding-family controlled firms could have more 
incentive to expropriate, and political connections facilitate this tunnelling.  
A typical example is the recent case of Jian Long Group‟s taking over Tong Gang Group in 
China. “Jian Long Group” is a privately controlled firm who has strong political connections 
in China. Since 1999, the “Jian Long Group” has acquired the ownership of several former 
state-owned steel companies with relatively low prices. In 2005, “Jian Long Group” obtained 
the control right over “Tong Gang Group”, which is the largest State owned steel company in 
Jilin province. However, after tunnelling Tong Gang Mine, which is the most valuable 
subsidiary of “Tong Gang Group”, and transforming huge operation loss to “Tong Gang 
Group”, “Jian Long Group” retreated from “Tong Gang Group” in 2008 because the price of 
steel products fell down sharply due to global financial crisis. Then in 2009, “Jian Long 
Group” went back, and got the control right again because the steel products price recovered 
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dramatically in China. The reason for the success taking over by Jian Long Group twice is its 
strong political connections. But this time, the tunnelling behaviour of “Jian Long Group” 
irritates the employees of “Tong Gang Group”, they killed Chen Guojun, the CEO from “Jian 
Long Group” in July 2009. In order to ease the social destabilisation, the provincial 
government, the ultimate owner of Tong Gang Group, interfered and stopped the whole 
taking over process of “Jian Long Group” over “Tong Gang Group”. 
(http://baike.baidu.com/view/2675039.htm). (See Figure 1) 
Another important feature of the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholder in China is 
that the ways that controlling shareholder used to tunnelling are also more complex than 
those in other economies. For example, as documented by Jiang et al. (2010), Chinese firms 
often use more related party loans which is recorded as “other receivables” in firm‟s balance 
sheet. This is because most of private firms in China are controlled by the controlling 
shareholder through complex pyramid structures. On the other hand, different from other 
economies, the controlling shareholder in China tends to spin-off part of its assets to go 
public. As a result, most of listed firms in China have a large number of related parties, which 
are ultimately controlled by the same controlling shareholder. There are usually lots of 
transactions between the listed firms and their related parties, so the controlling shareholder 
can easily occupy funds of the listed firms through related party loans. Therefore, the 
disproportional ownership structure may also facilitate the tunnelling of controlling 
shareholder, especially when the controlling shareholder chooses to tunnelling through 
related party loans. 
This paper makes three major contributions to current literature: first, while previous studies 
often examine the effect of disproportional ownership structure and political connections on 
firm value or performance respectively, this paper links the two areas and investigates their 
impact on firm leverage decisions, using a sample of private-owned firms from Chinese 
capital market. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that investigating this 
issue. Second, this paper further examines the effect of disproportional ownership structure 
on tunnelling behaviour of Chinese private-owned firms, by using related party loans as a 
new measure of tunnelling, thus this paper identifies an important channel through which the 
agency costs affect firm value. Third, this paper compares agency cost of disproportional 
ownership between founding-family controlled firms and non-founding family controlled 
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firms, which extend the existing literature that mainly focus on the comparison between 
founding family controlled firms and rest listed firms.  
Using our full sample of Chinese private-owned firms, we find that disproportional 
ownership structure and political connections are positively associated with leverage, while 
founding-family ownership is negatively associated with leverage. We further find that the 
interaction between disproportional ownership structure and political connections are also 
positively associated with leverage. These results indicate that controlling shareholders of 
Chinese private-owned firms tend to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to 
expand resources they controlled, and to expropriate the external investors and creditors, 
while political connections facilitate the tunnelling of controlling shareholder. 
By investigating whether disproportional ownership structure and political connections have 
different impact on leverage between founding-family controlled firms and non-founding-
family controlled firms, we find that disproportional ownership structure is negatively 
associated with leverage of family controlled firms, indicating that founding families have 
less incentive to control more resources to tunnelling. 
Finally, we find that the interacted term between disproportional ownership structure and 
regional creditor protection index is negatively associated with firm leverage, suggesting that 
better creditor protection could effectively reduce the tunnelling incentive of controlling 
shareholder.  We also find that disproportional ownership structure and the interacted term of 
disproportional ownership structure and political connections both have a positive 
relationship related party loans, which indicates that both disproportional ownership structure 
and political connections facilitate the tunnelling of controlling shareholder.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents literature reviews and 
develops several testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes how the variables are measured and 
what methodology was chosen. Section 4 presents our main empirical results and 
interpretation. Lastly, section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Institutional Background 
2.1 Literature Review 
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2.1.1 The Impact of disproportional ownership structure on firm leverage 
After the seminal paper of Classens et al. (2000) that identify the pyramid structure and cross-
holding as firms‟ major organizational forms to separate their ownership and control in eight 
East Asian economies, a number of prior studies have estimated the effect of disproportional 
ownership structure on firm value (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 
2004; Gompers et al., 2009). Although the estimates of these studies range widely, these 
researches often find that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights decreases firm 
value. Another important literature that examines the agency cost of disproportional 
ownership structure is to link the separation of cash flow rights and control rights to firm‟s 
cost of borrowing. For example, Aslan and Kumar (2009), and Lin et al. (2009) both find that 
the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights is associated with a higher cost of 
borrowing. Overall, all the above literature indicate that disproportional ownership structure 
increases firm‟s agency costs and reduces firm value. Considering the effect of 
disproportional ownership structure on firm‟s leverage ratio, Du and Dai (2005) find that the 
separation of cash flow rights and control rights is positively associated with leverage ratio 
due to the non-dilution effect, while Faccio et al. (2010) find a negative relationship between 
ownership control ratio (O/C) and leverage when the creditor protection system is weak. 
They argue that in firms with a weak creditor protection system, controlling shareholder tends 
to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to expand control of resources, and 
also to facilitate tunnelling. 
2.1.2 Disproportional ownership structure and tunnelling of controlling shareholders 
Johnson et al. (2000) first define “tunnelling” as “the transfer of resources out of a company 
to its controlling shareholder.” They also propose some channels of “tunnelling”, for example, 
asset sales, contracts such as transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling shareholder, 
excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, expropriation of corporate opportunities, 
and so on. After that, a number of studies analysed the effect of tunnelling by linking 
disproportional ownership structure to related party transactions. For example, Cheung et al. 
(2006) investigates the connected party transactions in Hong Kong during 1998-2000.They 
find that the announcing of connected party transactions is associated with a negative excess 
returns, and they argue that investors just have limited evidence that firms undertaking 
connected party transactions trade at a discounted valuation. Xiao and Zhao (2009) also find 
that the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights is negatively associated with 
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firm value, and the stock returns decrease around the connected party transaction 
announcements, by using a sample of Chinese private-owned firms during 2002-2007. In 
addition, Jiang et al. (2010) find that under during the period of 1996 to 2006, the divergence 
of cash flow rights and control rights is positively associated with tunnelling of controlling 
shareholder, by using related party loans as measures of tunnelling of controlling shareholder. 
2.1.3 Political connections and firm leverage decision 
The value of political connections has been widely studied in recent literature. Prior studies 
show that political connections help firms to secure favourable regulatory conditions 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and access to external financial resources such as bank loans 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Adhikari et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), which 
ultimately increases the value of firms (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007) or 
improves their performance (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). In particular, there are also studies 
investigating the role of political connections in China, but the results are mixed. Fan et al. 
(2008), Francis et al. (2009), Li et al. (2008) find that political connections in China have 
positive effect on firm value. While Fan et al. (2007) find that listed firms in China with 
politically connected CEOs underperform those without connected CEOs. In addition, Wu et 
al. (2010) show that private firms with political connections have higher value, while local 
state-owned enterprises with political connections have lower value.  
2.1.4 Family controlled firms and Disproportional ownership  
Prior studies indicate that founding families tend to concern more about their long-term 
interest in the firm, so the interest of founding-families are usually consistent with the firms. 
For example, James (1999) shows how founding family ownership provides incentives to 
invest according to the market rule (i.e., positive NPV projects) and suggests that founding-
family-controlled firm usually invest more efficiently than nonfamily firms because the 
family intends to pass the firms onto succeeding generations by demonstrating a two-period 
model. Casson (1999) and Chami (1999) provide further evidence to the argument of James 
(1999) by showing that founding-families tend to view the firms as an asset to pass on to their 
descendants rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes, so founding families are 
usually  long-term value maximization advocates. Considering the economic consequence of 
founding family ownership, Anderson et al. (2003) show that founding family firms have 
incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants, 
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so one consequence of families maintaining a long-term presence is that the firm will enjoy a 
lower cost of debt financing compared to non-family firms. Therefore founding-family-
owned firms performed better than non-founding-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
2.2 Salient feature of Chinese private-owned firms 
Historically, firms in China are almost fully owned by the central and local governments. 
Since the economic reform in 1978 particularly the establishment of two stok exchange 
markets in early 1990s, the percentage of ownership of firm owned by the government has 
been reduced markedly and private business in China has advanced and grown rapidly. In the 
year end of 2009, about 40 percent of Chinese A-share firms are ultimately controlled by 
private sectors. The emergence of private-owned firms in Chinese capital market follows two 
ways: 1) in the process of China‟s SOEs reform, some private entities or individuals have 
become the controlling shareholder in many listed firms through mergers and acquisitions 
(Chow, 2007). These are non-founding-family controlled firms; 2) since the setting up of the 
capital markets, a increasing number of entrepreneurs bring their businesses public by issuing 
shares in these two stock markets. These are the founding-family controlled firms.  
However, private-owned firms in China have suffered both political and social discrimination. 
Due to ideological reasons, private firms in China are always considered as an inferior form 
of ownership, the political environment was antagonistic toward the private sector (Li et al., 
2008). In addition, the economic environment in China is also unfavourable to private firms. 
Particularly, Chinese government still controls most of the resources, and SOEs still enjoy 
preferential status in obtaining bank loans, especially the bank loans from the state-owned 
commercial banks (Che, 2002; Brandt and Li, 2003). On the other hand, the purpose of the 
establishment of both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990s is to 
help revitalization and refinance its ailing state owned enterprises (SOEs) and to help to 
instill some elements of market discipline on top management (Firth et al., 2010). Compared 
to the SOEs, it is more difficult for the private-owned firms to get chance to raise capital 
through initial public offering or seasonal issuing. Under this circumstance, political 
connections become important for the private-owned firm‟s access to external financial 
resources for both bank loans and issuing equity. 
Furthermore, private-owned firms in China are conducive to tunnelling for the following 
reasons. 1). Most the private-owned firms listed in Chinese capital market have concentrated 
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ownership structure with a largest controlling shareholder and many minority small 
shareholders. 2). Due to lack of access to external funds, ultimate shareholder of private firms 
in China tends to use pyramid ownership structure to create internal capital markets that help 
relieving their external financing constraints (Fan et al., 2005). 3). Creditor and minority 
investor protection system in China is still weak. For example, China does not provide 
comprehensive laws and regulations regarding external investors, or cannot effectively 
implement the existing laws of administrating operation of the corporate or securities markets 
(Kaoto and Long, 2005). At the same time, listed firms in China face few external 
governance mechanisms (such as takeovers or other forms of investor activism) that might 
monitor the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholder effectively. Institutional 
ownership, particularly by mutual funds, is also low among Chinese firms (Jiang et al., 2010).  
2.4Hypothesis development 
Based on the forgoing analysis, in this subsection, we develop our main hypotheses 
considering the relationship between disproportional ownership structure, political 
connections and leverage decision of Chinese private-owned firms, with particular focus on 
the institutional environment in which private firms have grown up and the salient feature of 
Chinese private-owned firms. 
The influence of disproportional ownership structure (the divergence between cash flow 
rights and control rights of ultimate shareholder) on firm leverage is expected to be positive 
because as stated by Faccio et al. (2010) both disproportional ownership structure and higher 
leverage allows the controlling shareholder to control more resources without diluting his or 
her control over the firm. So pyramiding and debt should be substitutes, that is, great leverage 
should be associated with less pyramiding. However, they further find that controlling 
shareholder tends to use both higher leverage and disproportional ownership structure to 
expropriate resources from debtors and minority shareholders or to exploit new investment 
when the creditor protection system is weak. As discussed above, due to China‟s specific 
institutions, controlling shareholder of Chinese private-owned firms may have strong 
incentive to use both disproportional ownership structure and leverage to expropriate. Hence, 
we develop the following hypothesis: 
H1a: The divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholder 
is positively related with leverage ratio of Chinese private-owned firms. 
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In addition, we expect that entrepreneurs may have less incentive to tunnelling because 
founding families may concern more about their long-term interest in the firm (James, 1999; 
Casson, 1999; Chami, 1999), and founding-family ownership may reduce the agency 
conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders effectively (Anderson et 
al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Therefore, we expect that founding-family controlled 
firms with a disproportional ownership structure should have a lower leverage ratio. Thus, we 
propose the following hypothesis:  
H1b: The divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholder 
is negatively related with leverage ratio of Chinese entrepreneur controlled firms. 
As discussed in above sections, prior literature shows that political connections help firms to 
secure favourable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and access to external 
financial resources such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Adhikari et al., 
2006; Claessens et al., 2008). We expect the positive effect of political connections on firm‟s 
access to external financial resources also exists for Chinese private-owned firms, due to the 
political and social discrimination faced by private-owned firms in China. Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Political connections are positively associated with leverage ratio of Chinese private-
owned firms.  
On the other hand, we expect that political connections strengthen the positive impact of 
disproportional ownership structure on leverage. In other word, political connections are 
grabbing hands for controlling shareholder to expropriate. This is because political 
connections provide more excess external financial resources, which expands the resources 
controlled by controlling shareholder without the dilution of his/her control rights (Faccio et 
ak., 2010). Furthermore, the positive effect of political connections on the relationship 
between disproportional ownership structure and leverage should be more important when 
the separation between cash flow rights and control rights is high. Particularly, it is argued 
that firms with larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights usually have 
higher agency conflicts and face higher borrowing cost (Aslan and Kumar, 2009; Lin et al., 
2009), so the controlling shareholder tends to depend on political connections to expand the 
resources they controlled. So we further expect that the interaction of disproportional 
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ownership structure and political connections are positively associated with firm leverage. 
Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2b: the interaction of political connections and the divergence of cash flow rights and 
control rights are also positively associated with firm leverage. 
Recent studies also show that the tunnelling incentive of controlling shareholders may also be 
influenced by regional creditor and investor protection system. For example, Dyck and 
Zingales (2002) argue that better protection of invertors could lead to a decrease of the 
private interest of largest shareholders, and thus reduce the tunnelling effect of the controlling 
shareholders. Du and Dai (2005), Faccio et al., (2010) also find that the separation of cash 
flow rights and control rights is negatively associated with firm leverage when the creditor 
protection system is strong. We expect that the interaction of creditor protection and 
disproportional ownership structure on leverage also exist within China as China has a 
diverse markets structure and geographic regions, and the legal and institutional environment 
within China also differs in different regions. Thus, we propose our last hypothesis: 
H3: the interaction of creditor protection system and the divergence of cash flow rights and 
control rights are negatively associated with firm leverage. 
 
3. Methodology and Measurement of Variables 
3.1 Data Collection 
All the data used in this paper comes from a series of datasets developed by the SinoFin 
Information Services of the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) at Beijing 
University: the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database (2004-2009), the Chinese 
Listed Firm Corporate Governance Database (2004-2009), the Database of Chinese Listed 
Firms with Private Ultimate Owners (2004-2009). The Chinese Listed Firms with Private 
Ultimate Owners Database (2004-2009) presents ownership structure, corporate governance 
and ultimate shareholder information of all Chinese publicly listed private-owned firms. This 
database collects information directly from firms‟ annual reports. Since 2004, all Chinese 
listed firms have been required by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) to 
report the identities of their ultimate owners as well as the control chains in their annual 
reports. The CSRC defines the “ultimate owner” of a publicly listed company as: (1) the 
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largest shareholder; or (2) the shareholder with a greater voting power than the largest 
shareholder; or (3) the shareholder with shareholding or voting rights above 30% of the total 
shares or voting rights in the company; or (4) the shareholder who can determine over half of 
the board members.  
We exclude (1) Financial firms; (2) “ST” firms or negative-equity firms; (3) firms whose 
relevant data are not complete or cannot be acquired. To ensure that our results are not driven 
by firms entering and leaving the samples, we include only firms that existed in the databases 
for the entire period between 2004 and 2009. The final sample consists of 1,614 firm-year 
observations during 2004 to 2009.  
 
3.2 Measuring Variables 
This study uses three different measures of capital structure as dependent variables, which are  
leverage ratio (LEV), short-term debt ratio (STDR) and short-term bank ratio (STBR) for the 
following reasons: 1) due to the under-development of China‟s long-term debt market, most 
of Chinese firms depend mainly on short-term debt; 2) We also use short-term bank ratio as 
dependent variable because bank loans remain the most important form of external financing 
in most economies around the world (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Drucker and Puri, 
2006). In this paper, we use the regression results of LEV as main dependent variable, and 
the regression results of STDR and STBR are used as robust tests for the main results. 
Variables that measure the separation of cash flow rights and control rights are used as one 
type of main independent variables in the regression. The above database also defines the 
cash flows rights and control rights of the ultimate owners in the same way as in Claessens et 
al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), and Faccio and Lang (2002). The cash flow rights are 
measured by the sum of the products of the proportions of ownership along the control chains, 
while the control rights are measured by the minimum proportions of ownership along the 
control chains. To measure the separation of cash flow rights and control rights of Chinese 
listed firms, we compute the divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights in 
three methods: (1) the “wedge”, which is computed by subtracting the cash flow rights from 
the control rights; (2) the separate dummy, which is set equate to 1 if control rights of the 
ultimate shareholders exceeds the cash flow rights; (3) the “ratio”, which is computed by 
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dividing the control rights by the cash flow rights (the “ratio” is the same as the “cash flow 
rights leverage” in Lemmon and Lins (2003).  
In addition, variables that measure political connections and founding-family ownership are 
also used as key independent variables in this paper. Following Fan et al. (2007), we define a 
CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently serving or formerly served in the 
government or military, or as a deputy of the National/provincial People‟s Congress or 
People‟s Political Consultative Conference. However, we extend their exploration of the 
political connectedness of CEOs to include chairmen, as both are important in China, 
especially for private-owned firms. Following Anderson et al. (2003), we also use ownership-
based dummy-variable approach as the primary indicator of family ownership in our paper, 
we define a firms as founding-family if the firm is controlled by entrepreneur or founding 
family. Information about political connections and founding-family ownership is mainly 
collected by hands. 
Furthermore, several control variables are also included in our regression, considering other 
factors that influence capital structure decision of Chinese listed firms. Detailed definition 
and calculation of all variables used in this paper is report in Table 1. 
<Table 1 here> 
3.3 Regression model 
In this paper, we use the following equation as basic regression model. 
1 2
3 4
Dependent variables= disproportional ownership+ political connections




       Eq (1) 
In Equation (1), the measure of main dependent and independent variable are as detailed in 
previous section. The interacted terms of main independent variables may be added to this 
basic model when necessary.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1 Sample description 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A of Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics for the full sample. Panel A shows that the average leverage ratio (short-
term debt ratio) for our sample is 46.39 (40.51) percent, as expected, most of the total 
leverage comes from short-term debt. In addition, 75.64 percent of our sample firms have 
disproportional ownership structures, and the wedge (ratio) between cash flow rights and 
control rights is 9.86 percent (1.7788), obviously, disproportional ownership structure is 
widely used by our sample firms. Panel A also shows that 42.34 percent of our sample firms 
have political connections (political connected chairman or CEO); 51.64 percent of the 
sample firms are controlled by founding-families. Considering the firm specific control 
variables, panel A shows that the average cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder are 
25.69 percent, indicating that controlling shareholder controls a relatively high portion of the 
firms; Approximately 25.56 percent of the total assets are fixed assets; the average effective 
tax rate, total assets, ROA, and growth is 1.17 percent, 1.4808 billion Yuan, 4.15 percent and 
30.52 percent respectively.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents a simple bivariate mean comparison of the main dependent and 
independent variables based on different classifications. In panel B, column 1 through 3 
presents the mean comparison of firms with and without political connections; column 4 
through 6 presents the mean comparison of founding-family and non-founding family 
controlled firms; while column 7 through 9 presents the mean comparison of firms with and 
without disproportional ownership structure. The results in column 1 through 3 show that 
firms with political connections have statistically significantly higher level of leverage ratios 
(leverage ratio, short-term debt, and short-term bank loan ratio) than firms without political 
connections, which is consistent with H2a, thus H2a is supported by our bivariate test here. 
The results in column 4 through 6 show that founding family controlled firms tend to have 
lower leverage ratios, lower control-ownership wedge, and less political connections than 
non-founding-family controlled firms. The results in columns 7 through 9 show that firms 
with disproportional ownership structure also have higher leverage ratios, which is also 
consistent with H1a.  In addition, panel B also shows that large firms, firms with higher level 
of control-ownership wedge, and non-founding-family controlled firms are more likely to 
have political connections. 




4.2 Regression results for full sample 
 
Table 3 presents the full sample regression results that link the disproportional ownership 
structure and political connections with leverage ratio of private-owned firms in Chinese 
capital market. In the regression, the degree of separation of cash flow rights and control 
rights is measured by three different variables separately. The “wedge” columns present the 
regression results, using the control-ownership wedge as independent variable, and leverage 
ratios as dependent variables. The “Separate” columns and “C/O” columns employ two 
alternative measures of the degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights, which 
are the separate dummy, and the control-ownership ratio. We expect that the larger the 
independent variables, the higher are the degree of separation of ownership and control. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results using leverage ratio as dependent variable. In Panel A, 
in column 1 through 3, we use the three measure of the separation of cash flow rights and 
control rights and political connections as main independent variables, while in column 4 
through 6, we further add the interacted terms of the measures of disproportional ownership 
structure and political connections to our regression to see their interaction effect on firm 
leverage. 
The results in column 1 show that control-ownership wedge is statistically positively related 
to leverage ratio, the results are robust when we use the divergence dummy and control-
ownership ratio as independent variables, as shown in column 2 and 3. These results indicate 
that controlling shareholder of private-owned firms tends to use both pyramiding and debt to 
expropriate, especially when the control-ownership wedge of the controlling shareholder is 
high, which is consistent with hypothesis H1a, so this hypothesis is proved.   
The results in column 1 through 3 also show that political connections is also positively 
related to leverage ratio, indicating that political connections are helpful for private-owned 
firms in China to get access to external debt financing, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H2a and other prior studies such as Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Faccio(2006). In addition, 




Column 4 through 6 presents the regression results considering the interaction effect of 
political connections and disproportional ownership on leverage. As expected, the interacted 
term is statistically positively related to leverage ratio of Chinese private-owned firms, so our 
hypothesis H2b is also proved. This result indicates that political connections in China not 
only help private-owned firms getting external resources, but also facilitate the expropriation 
of controlling shareholders. 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, we find that most of them have statistically 
significant explanatory power. Our result shows that higher effect tax rate is associated with 
lower leverage ratios, which is inconsistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory, 
arguing that firms with higher tax rate should borrow to utilize the tax-shield effect. This 
suggests that the tax advantages of debt capital are not attractive to firms in China – a result 
not uncommon in developing countries (see Booth et al., 2001). Our result also shows that the 
coefficient of firm size is positive and statistically significant. The result supports the view 
that firm size serves as an inverse proxy for unobservable credit risk, which implies that 
larger firms should be more highly leveraged. As predicted by the pecking-order theory, 
higher profitability is associated with a lower leverage level. This is due to the fact that 
higher profit firms tend to rely more on internal financing, while lower profit firms raise more 
external debt to compensate for the shortage of internal funds. 
Panel B and panel C of Table 3 presents the regression results using short-term debt ratio and 
short-term bank loans ratio as key dependent variable. We find that almost all the results in 
panel B and panel C are consistent with the results in panel A. So our results in panel A are 
robust. 
<Table 3 here> 
 
4.3 Regression results of founding-family and non-founding family controlled firms 
As discussed in above sections, private-owned firms in China can further be classified into 
two types, which are founding-family controlled firms and non-founding-family controlled 
firms, we also expect that the disproportional ownership structure may have negative impact 
on founding-family controlled firms. In order to test this argument, we further separate our 
sample to founding-family controlled and non-founding-family controlled firms, and conduct 
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a new regression, the results are reported below in Table 4. In Table 4, we also measure the 
disproportional ownership structure using three different measures, which are control-
ownership wedge, separate dummy and control-ownership ratio. Panel A of Table 4 presents 
the regression results of founding-family controlled firms and panel B presents the results of 
non-founding-family controlled firms. In both panel A and panel B, column 1 through 3 
presents the results using leverage ratio as dependent variable, column 4 through 6 presents 
the results using short-term debt ratio as dependent variable, and column 7 through 9 presents 
the results using short-term bank loans ratio as dependent variable. 
 
Panel A shows that the control-ownership wedge is statistically negatively related to leverage 
ratio of founding-family controlled firms. Therefore, our hypothesis H1b is also proved. This 
result indicates that compared to the controlling shareholders of non-founding-family 
controlled firms, founding families have less incentive to use more debt to expropriate, 
especially when the control-ownership wedge is large. While in panel B, we find that the 
control-ownership wedge is statistically positively related with firm leverage, indicating that 
non-founding-family controlled firms with a disproportional ownership structure tends to use 
more debt to expropriate. In addition, Table 4 shows that the interacted term of political 
connections and disproportional ownership is statistically positively related with leverage 
ratio in both panel A and panel B, which is consistent with H2b. 
The results in column 4 through 9 in both panel of Table 4 show that all our results are also 
robust when we use short-term debt ratio and short-term bank loans ratio as dependent 
variable.  
<Table 4 here> 
 
4.4 The interaction effect of disproportional ownership structure and creditor protection 
index  
As documented by Faccio et al. (2010), the relationship between disproportional ownership 
and leverage is also influenced by the quality of creditor protection. However, no prior 
literature tests this relationship within one country, such as China. In this paper, we can test 
this argument by examining the effect of disproportional ownership structure on leverage in 
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regions that have different quality of creditor protection. In order to conduct our regression, 
we further create interacted terms that combine our measures of the separation of cash flow 
rights and control rights with measures of legal and institutional environment quality in 
different regions within China. We use the market index (Index) constructed by Fan et al. 
(2007) to measure the cross-province differential in creditor rights protection. The market 
index considered encompass various dimensions such as “relationship between government 
and market”, “development of non-state-owned economy”, “development of product market ”, 
“development of factor market”, and “legal and institutional environment” to construct 
market index in different provinces. A higher value of the creditor rights index corresponds to 
stronger rights of creditors. Among all Chinese provinces, there exists a substantial variation 
in the value of creditor rights index and thus in legal protection of creditors. For example, 
Tibet has the lowest score (4.25), and Shanghai has the highest score (11.71) in the year 2007.  
However, the report of Fan et al. (2007) provide the yearly market index up to 2007, but our 
sample is during 2004 to 2009, so we just have 4 years observations in this regression. The 
results are presented in Table 5. In Table 5, column 1 through 3, column 4 through 6, and 
column 7 through 9 present the results using leverage ratio, short-term debt ratio and short-
term bank loan ratio as dependent variable respectively.  
The results in Table 5 show that the coefficients for the interacted term between 
disproportional ownership structure variables and legal protection of creditor rights indexes 
are consistently negative, and are statistically significant in most cases (all the coefficients are 
statistically significant when using divergence dummy and control-ownership ratio as 
measures of disproportional ownership structure). This result indicates that in regions with 
weak creditor protection system, the controlling shareholder tends to use more debt to 
expropriate in the case of a high control-ownership wedge, so our hypothesis H3 is also 
proved. This result is also consistent with Faccio et al. (2010), who also find this relationship 
using a cross-country sample.  
<Table 5 here> 
 




4.5.1 The effect of disproportional ownership structure and political connections on related 
party loans 
While in above sections, we estimate the effect of disproportional ownership structure on 
leverage decision of Chinese private-owned firms. The evidences indicate that controlling 
shareholder of private-owned firms in China tend to use both disproportional ownership 
structure and debt to expropriate. However, we still do not know the effect of disproportional 
ownership on the related party loans, which is always considered to be an important channel 
through which the controlling shareholder expropriates the interest of external investors in 
Chinese capital market (Jiang et al., 2010).  
As indicated by Jiang et al. (2010), the related party loans, especially the funds occupied by 
controlling shareholders in China are usually recorded as “Other receivable” in firm‟s 
Balance Sheet. In this section, we further examine the impact of disproportional ownership 
structure on related party loans, as a robust test for our main argument that controlling 
shareholder of private-owned firms in China tend to use both disproportional ownership 
structure and debt to expropriate. In order to do this, we create a new variable “ORECTA” 
(other receivables scaled by total assets) as dependent variable, and conduct a new regression. 
The results are reported in Table 6, we expect a positive relationship between the control-
ownership wedge and the variable ORECTA. In Table 6, column 1 through 3 presents the 
regression results using different measures of disproportional ownership structure. 
The results in Table 6 show that the coefficients of the three measures of disproportional 
ownership structure are statistically significantly positive at 10% level of significance, 
indicating that controlling shareholders of firms with larger control-ownership wedge are 
more likely to tunnelling through related party loans. This result is consistent with Jiang et al. 
(2010), indicating that controlling shareholder in China tends to occupy more funds from 
their listed affiliate, when the separation of cash flow rights and control rights of the 
controlling shareholder is high. The result also supports our argument in above sections that 
controlling shareholder of private-owned firms in China tends to use both disproportional 
ownership structure and debt to tunnelling.  
In addition, the coefficients of the interacted term between disproportional ownership 
structure and political connections are consistently positive, and most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at 10% level of significance. This result indicates that when the 
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control-ownership wedge is large, political connections facilitate the tunnelling behaviour of 
controlling shareholder. This result is also consistent with our results in above sections. 
Table 6 also shows that founding-family controlled firms and firms in regions with strong 
creditor protection have less ORECTA, which is also consistent with our above results, 
arguing that founding families have less incentive to tunnelling and better creditor protection 
is important for reducing the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholder. 
<Table 6 here> 
 
4.5.2Regression results of firms with a founding-family CEO 
Following Anderson et al. (2003) who show that founding-family can further influence 
agency conflicts by placing one of their family members in the CEO position, by holding the 
role of CEO, families can more closely align the firm‟s actions with their own interests; 
suggesting an incremental reduction in the agency cost of debt or a better performance 
relative to non-family firms or family firms with outside CEOs. We also distinguish firms 
with or without founding CEOs, and analysing whether founding-family CEOs have positive 
or negative impact on the relationship between disproportional ownership structure and firm 
leverage. In order to do this, we create a new variable “Founder CEO”, which equates to 1 if 
the firm‟s CEO is a founding-family member. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Our results show that the interacted term of disproportional ownership structure and founder 
CEO is statistically significantly related with leverage ratio, indicating that compared to 
controlling shareholder of non-founding family firms or family firms with outside CEOs, 
who tends to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to expropriate, 
controlling shareholder of firm with founding-family CEOs tends to use less debt when the 
separation of cash flow rights and control rights is large. This result is similar to the results 
reported in Table 4, where we separate our sample to founding-family and non-founding-
family controlled firms, and find a negative relationship between disproportional ownership 
structure and leverage in non-founding-family controlled firms. 






This study shows that under China‟s specific institutional environment, disproportional 
ownership structure has a positive influence on leverage ratio of Chinese private-owned firms, 
which is consistent with the theory that controlling shareholder of firms with disproportional 
ownership structure tends to use excess debt to tunnelling when the creditor protection is 
weak (Faccio et al., 2010). The results also show that political connections and founding-
family ownership have positive and negative impact on leverage ratio and the effect between 
disproportional ownership structure and leverage ratio. In addition, this study also provides 
evidence that a better protection of market institutions can effectively reduce the tunnelling 
incentive of controlling shareholder, especially when the control-ownership wedge is large.  
Finally, this paper also provides some evidence that how the controlling shareholder of firms 
with disproportional ownership structure expropriate the external investors. We show that 
controlling shareholder of firms with disproportional ownership structure tends to occupy 
more funds from their listed affiliate through related party loans.   
Overall, this paper suggests that controlling shareholder of Chinese private-owned firms 
tends to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to tunnelling. Political 
connections through political connected chairman or CEO facilitate the tunnelling, while 
founding-family ownership and strong creditor protection legal and institutional environment 
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Table 1 Detailed definitions for all variables used in this paper 
Variables names variable definitions 
dependent variables: 
 
Leverage ratio (LEV) Total debt to total assets 
Short-term debt ratio (STDR) Total short-term debt to total assets 
Short-term Bank loan ratio (STBR) Total short-term bank financing to total assets 
Main independent  variables: 
 
Control-Ownership wedge (Wedge) cash flow rights subtracted by control rights 
Separate dummy(Separation) 
A dummy variable that equals to 1 if control rights of the ultimate 
shareholders exceeds the cash flow rights 
Control-Ownership ratio (C/O) Control rights divided by cash flow rights 
Political connections (Political) 
A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO or chairman of the board 
is currently or was formerly an officer of the government or military or 




A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm is controlled by the 
entrepreneur 
Firm-specific control variables: 
 
Cash flow rights (Cashflow) Total cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder 
Tangibility (Tangi) Net fixed assets/Total assets 
Effective tax rate (Tax) Total tax paid by the firm to total assets 
Size (Size) Log 10 of total assets 
Profitability (ROA)  Ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets 
Growth (Grow) Percentage change of sales revenue 
Other control variables: 
 
Creditor protection  index(Index) 
we adopt the marketization index for China‟s provinces by Fan et al. 
(2007) 
Industry dummy (Industry) Dummy variables that reflect firm's industry 







Table2 Description statistics of the sample 
Panel A. Summary statistics        
 
MEAN Medium STDEV P25 P75 
LEV 0.4639  0.4725  0.1652  0.3437  0.5861  
STDR 0.4051  0.4092  0.1581  0.2882  0.5190  
STBR 0.1643  0.1593  0.1184  0.0661  0.2459  
Wedge 0.0986  0.0816  0.0947  0.0023  0.1619  
Separate 0.7564  1.0000  0.4279  1.0000  1.0000  
C/O 1.7788  1.3369  1.1931  1.0039  1.9612  
Political 0.4234  0.0000  0.4939  0.0000  1.0000  
Cashflow 0.2569  0.2300  0.1534  0.1446  0.3487  
Founder 0.5164  1.0000  0.4996  0.0000  1.0000  
Tangi 0.2556  0.2379  0.1563  0.1400  0.3581  
TAX 0.0117  0.0084  0.0133  0.0038  0.0158  
SIZE 1.4808  1.3826  0.4640  0.7268  2.6712  
ROA 0.0415  0.0351  0.0652  0.0130  0.0665  
Grow 0.3052  0.1257  2.8282  -0.0052  0.3205  
Panel B. Mean comparison of main dependent and independent variables based on different classifications 
  political Non-pol Diff. Founder non-fou Diff. Separate non-sep Diff. 
LEV 0.5218  0.4213  12.6609***  0.4230  0.5076  -10.6293***  0.4790  0.4169  6.5747***  
STDR 0.4466  0.3747  9.2706***  0.3762  0.4360  -7.7484***  0.4204  0.3578  6.9329***  
STBR 0.1827  0.1508  5.4219***  0.1515  0.1780  -4.5218***  0.1712  0.1430  4.1392***  
Wedge 0.1006  0.0971  0.7381  0.0902  0.1075  -3.7065***  
   
Separation 0.7804  0.7387  1.9273*  0.6591  0.8603  -9.6695***  
   
C/O 1.8771  1.7167  2.7382***  1.5196  2.0555  -9.7288***  
   
Political 
   
0.3806  0.4692  -3.6144***  0.4369  0.3817  1.9273*  
Found 0.4641  0.5548  -3.6144***  
   
0.4500  0.7226  -9.6695***  
          
Notes: This Table reports the mean comparison of the main dependent and independent variables. Definitions of 
all the variables are reported in Table 1. Political (non-pol) column presents the mean of firms with political 
connections (without political connections); Founder (non-fou) column presents the mean of firms controlled by 
founding-family (non-founding-family); Separate (non-sep) column presents the mean of firms with 
disproportional ownership structure (without disproportional ownership structure). Diff. columns present the T-
test results for the bivariate mean comparisons. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical 











Table3. Regression results for the full sample 
Panel A. leverage ratio as dependent variable 
Variable LEV LEV 
   Wedge  separate  C/O  Wedge  separate  C/O 
C -0.8090  -0.8018  -0.8222  -0.8772  -0.8147  -0.8515  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Wedge 0.0129***      0.0100**      
  0.0044      0.0294      
Separate   0.0169*      -0.0065    
    0.0507      0.4864    
C/O     0.0176***      0.0050  
      0.0000      0.1959  
Wedge*Political       0.2343***      
        0.0000      
Separate*Political         0.0597***    
          0.0000    
C/O*Political           0.0237***  
            0.0000  
POLITICAL 0.0627***  0.0618***  0.0605***        
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000        
CASHFLOW -0.0312  -0.0155  0.0344  -0.0063  -0.0141  0.0280  
  0.1917  0.5377  0.2010  0.7977  0.5764  0.3023  
Founder -0.0602***  -0.0599***  -0.0591***  -0.0648***  -0.0618***  -0.0601***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
TANGIBILITY -0.0359  -0.0236  -0.0210  -0.0290  -0.0205  -0.0184  
  0.1096  0.2899  0.3429  0.2045  0.3623  0.4088  
TAX -0.5577*  -0.5291*  -0.5644*  -0.5456*  -0.4981  -0.5447*  
  0.0723  0.0887  0.0674  0.0836  0.1112  0.0793  
SIZE 0.1446***  0.1419***  0.1407***  0.1534***  0.1459***  0.1473***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ROA -0.6654***  -0.6760***  -0.6689***  -0.6894***  -0.6860***  -0.6880***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
GROWTH 0.0019  0.0020  0.0022  0.0018  0.0018  0.0020  
  0.2311  0.2090  0.1790  0.2745  0.2585  0.2105  
R2 0.3214  0.3196  0.3292  0.3002  0.3108  0.3209  
Adj. R2 0.3155  0.3137  0.3233  0.2941  0.3048  0.3150  










Panel B. short-term debt ratio as dependent variable 
Variable STDR STDR 
   Wedge  separate  C/O  Wedge  separate  C/O 
C -0.3856  -0.3782  -0.3982  -0.4205  -0.3653  -0.4034  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Wedge 0.0152***      0.0128***      
  0.0012      0.0066      
Separate   0.0297***      0.0084    
    0.0009      0.3803    
C/O     0.0183***      0.0072*  
      0.0000      0.0739  
Wedge*Political       0.2230***      
        0.0000      
Separate*Political         0.0543***    
          0.0000    
C/O*Political           0.0208***  
            0.0000  
POLITICAL 0.0473***  0.0462***  0.0449***        
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000        
CASHFLOW -0.0530**  -0.0259  0.0156  -0.0295  -0.0248  0.0093  
  0.0326  0.3203  0.5766  0.2450  0.3407  0.7397  
Founder -0.0353***  -0.0341***  -0.0344***  -0.0388***  -0.0350***  -0.0347***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
TANGIBILITY -0.0736***  -0.0571**  -0.0569**  -0.0669***  -0.0539**  -0.0544**  
  0.0016  0.0137  0.0133  0.0044  0.0198  0.0179  
TAX -0.3587  -0.3147  -0.3642  -0.3661  -0.3016  -0.3592  
  0.2647  0.3278  0.2550  0.2580  0.3478  0.2614  
SIZE 0.0924***  0.0881***  0.0881***  0.0968***  0.0885***  0.0913***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ROA -0.5777***  -0.5873***  -0.5834***  -0.5922***  -0.5899***  -0.5950***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
GROWTH 0.0016  0.0018  0.0018  0.0015  0.0016  0.0017  
  0.3393  0.2874  0.2714  0.3719  0.3278  0.2969  
Adj. R2 0.1941  0.1943  0.2023  0.1849  0.1957  0.2027  









Panel C. short-term bank loan ratio as dependent variable 
Variable STBR STBR 
   Wedge separate  C/O  Wedge separate  C/O 
C -0.3483  -0.3412  -0.3448  -0.3715  -0.3443  -0.3452  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Wedge 0.0112***      0.0104***      
  0.0013      0.0028      
Separate   0.0063      -0.0004    
    0.3460      0.9539    
C/O     0.0034      -0.0011  
      0.1992      0.7231  
Wedge*Political       0.0588*      
        0.0944      
Separate*Political         0.0170***    
          0.0068    
C/O*Political           0.0083***  
            0.0011  
POLITICAL 0.0182***  0.0174***  0.0172***        
  0.0010  0.0016  0.0019        
CASHFLOW -0.0680***  -0.0618***  -0.0549***  -0.0618***  -0.0614***  -0.0574***  
  0.0002  0.0014  0.0085  0.0010  0.0015  0.0059  
Founder -0.0116**  -0.0122**  -0.0124**  -0.0129**  -0.0127**  -0.0124**  
  0.0407  0.0322  0.0295  0.0224  0.0255  0.0283  
TANGIBILIT? 0.1497***  0.1586***  0.1585***  0.1515***  0.1595***  0.1595***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
TAX -1.4748***  -1.4588***  -1.4687***  -1.4679***  -1.4503***  -1.4678***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
SIZE 0.0564***  0.0550***  0.0551***  0.0594***  0.0560***  0.0561***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ROA -0.2715***  -0.2832***  -0.2827***  -0.2793***  -0.2859***  -0.2869***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
GROWTH -0.0011  -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0011  
  0.3903  0.4050  0.4066  0.3724  0.3811  0.3903  
R2 0.2178  0.2132  0.2135  0.2138  0.2119  0.2140  
Adj. R2 0.2110  0.2063  0.2067  0.2070  0.2050  0.2072  
    F-stat 31.7877  30.9235  30.9925  31.0477  30.6880  31.0849  
Notes: This Table presents the regression results for the full sample firms. Definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Table 1. Panel A presents the results using leverage ratio as dependent variable; Panel B presents the 
results using short-term debt ratio as dependent variable; Panel C presents the results using short-term bank 
loans ratio as dependent variable; Wedge columns present the results using control-ownership wedge as measure 
of disproportional ownership structure; separate columns present the results using separate dummy as measure 
of disproportional ownership structure; C/O columns present the results using control-ownership ratio as 
measure of disproportional ownership structure; Column 1 through 3 presents the results without the interaction 
effect of disproportional ownership structure and political connections; column 4 through 6 presents the results 
considering the interaction effect of disproportional ownership structure and political connections. The year 
dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported; p-values are displayed in 
italics; * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical 





Table 4. Regression results for founding-family and non-founding-family controlled firms 
Panel A. Regression results for founding-family controlled firms 
Variable LEV STDR STBR 
   wedge 
 
separate 
 C/O  Wedge 
 
separate 




C -1.2045  -1.1674  -1.0965  -0.6388  -0.6090  -0.5442  -0.4175  -0.4140  -0.3545  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  




    
  0.0490      0.0240      0.0058      
Separate   -0.0105      -0.0066      -0.0116    
    0.3258      0.5392      0.1491    
C/O     -0.0036      -0.0103      
-0.0118 
** 





    
0.2768**
*  
    
0.1125 
*** 
    






    
0.0461**
*  
    0.0164*    
    0.0001      0.0001      0.0668    
C/O*Political     0.031***      0.029***      
0.0148**
*  
      0.0000      0.0000      0.0005  
CASHFLOW -0.0311  -0.0217  -0.0014  0.0030  0.0186  0.0144  -0.0540**  -0.042*  -0.053**  








-0.089***  -0.152 ** -0.155***  -0.160**  0.153***  0.152***  0.145***  
  0.0070  0.0054  0.0036  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  










0.170***  0.118***  0.113***  0.107***  0.063***  0.062***  0.056***  











































0.0017  0.0024  0.0019  
  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.8059  0.7372  0.7909  
Adj. R2 0.3477  0.3497  0.3629  0.2408  0.2420  0.2530  0.1927  0.1883  0.1986  











Panel B. Regression results for non-founding family controlled firms 
Variable LEV STDR STBR 
   Wedge 
 
Separate 
 C/O  Wedge 
 
separate 




C -0.6136  -0.5832  -0.6383  -0.2328  -0.2092  -0.2605  -0.3530  -0.3363  -0.3468  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0511  0.0726  0.0257  0.0001  0.0002  0.0001  
Wedge 0.0095*      0.0126**      
0.0116**
*  
    
  0.0556      0.0139      0.0026      
Separate   0.0178      
0.0581**
*  
    0.0274**    
    0.2952      0.0009      0.0399    
C/O     0.0121**      
0.0147**
*  
    0.0038  





    
0.2710**
*  
    0.0646      






    
0.0645**
*  
    0.0166*    
    0.0000      0.0000      0.0653    
C/O*Political     
0.0188**
*  
    
0.0164**
*  
    0.0045  
      0.0000      0.0002      0.1830  




-0.0706**  -0.0684*  
  0.4625  0.4382  0.0244  0.0604  0.3056  0.9800  0.0030  0.0298  0.0530  







  0.8816  0.2594  0.6017  0.7609  0.2201  0.9064  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  



























































  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
GROWTH 0.0008  0.0011  0.0010  0.0006  0.0012  0.0009  -0.0012  -0.0010  -0.0011  
  0.6605  0.5427  0.5526  0.7318  0.5016  0.6225  0.3786  0.4865  0.4120  
Adj. R2 0.1887  0.2105  0.2194  0.1416  0.1763  0.1674  0.2167  0.2163  0.2114  
    F-stat 14.9332  16.9739  17.8419  10.8868  13.8293  13.0471  17.5790  17.5418  17.0653  
Notes: This Table presents the regression results for founding-family controlled firms and non-founding-family 
controlled firms. Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1. Panel A presents the results of 
founding-family controlled firms; Panel B presents the results of non-founding-family controlled firms; Wedge 
columns present the results using control-ownership wedge as measure of disproportional ownership structure; 
separate columns present the results using separate dummy as measure of disproportional ownership structure; 
C/O columns present the results using control-ownership ratio as measure of disproportional ownership structure; 
Column 1 through 3 presents the results using leverage ratio as dependent variable; column 4 through 6 presents 
the results using short-term debt ratio as dependent variable; column 7 through 9 presents the results using short-
term bank loans ratio as dependent variable; The year dummies and industry dummies are included in each 
regression, but not reported; p-values are displayed in italics; * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** 







Table 5. Regression results with the interaction of creditor protection index 
Variable LEV STDR STBR 
   Wedge  Separate  C/O  Wedge  Separate  C/O  Wedge  Separate  C/O 
C -0.7577  -0.7580  -0.7635  -0.4104  -0.4168  -0.4186  -0.4380  -0.4354  -0.4354  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Wedge 0.0080     0.0106*     0.0098**     
  0.1917     0.0886     0.0444     
Separate   0.0529**     0.0724***     0.0501***    
    0.0187     0.0016     0.0054   
C/O     0.0279***     0.0241***     0.0133**  
      0.0003     0.0023     0.0316  
Wedge*Index -0.0031     -0.0009     -0.0042     
  0.5579     0.8636     0.3184     
Separate*Index   -0.0050**     -0.0050**     -0.0047**   
    0.0280     0.0295     0.0103   
C/O*Index     -0.0027***     -0.0022**     -0.0019**  
      0.0039     0.0192     0.0122  
POLITICAL 0.0611***  0.0593***  0.0600***  0.0465***  0.0444***  0.0451***  0.0144***  0.0127***  0.0134***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0396  0.0694  0.0538  
CASHFLOW -0.0646**  -0.0421  -0.0258  -0.0695**  -0.0367  -0.0396  -0.0774***  -0.0529**  -0.0704***  
  0.0363  0.1729  0.4468  0.0271  0.2423  0.2531  0.0017  0.0318  0.0098  
Founder -0.0742***  -0.0722***  -0.0706***  -0.0525***  -0.0482***  -0.0492***  -0.0222***  -0.0207***  -0.0209***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0022  0.0044  0.0042  
TANGIBILITY -0.0284  -0.0237  -0.0227  -0.0901***  -0.0814***  -0.0849***  0.1490***  0.1556***  0.1534***  
  0.3111  0.3917  0.4097  0.0016  0.0039  0.0026  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
TAX -1.0756***  -0.9871***  -1.0251***  -0.9207***  -0.7968**  -0.8667**  -1.5802***  -1.4996***  -1.5405***  
  0.0019  0.0044  0.0029  0.0089  0.0236  0.0136  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
SIZE 0.1422***  0.1402***  0.1401***  0.0989***  0.0958***  0.0977***  0.0690***  0.0665***  0.0685***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ROA -0.5181***  -0.5199***  -0.5160***  -0.4525***  -0.4502***  -0.4583***  -0.2263***  -0.2309***  -0.2366***  
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002  
GROWTH 0.0015  0.0016  0.0016  0.0013  0.0015  0.0013  -0.0013  -0.0013  -0.0014  
  0.3434  0.3282  0.3251  0.4150  0.3679  0.4114  0.2900  0.3120  0.2793  
Adj. R2 0.3190  0.3214  0.3263  0.2122  0.2187  0.2170  0.2046  0.2071  0.2059  
    F-statistic 38.6818  39.1107  39.9734  22.6778  23.5257  23.3053  21.6930  22.0140  21.8677  
Notes: This Table presents the regression results for the interaction effect of disproportional ownership structure 
and regional creditor protection index. Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1. Column 1 through 
3 presents the results using leverage ratio as dependent variable; column 4 through 6 presents the results using 
short-term debt ratio as dependent variable; column 7 through 9 presents the results using short-term bank loans 
ratio as dependent variable; Wedge columns present the results using control-ownership wedge as measure of 
disproportional ownership structure; separate columns present the results using separate dummy as measure of 
disproportional ownership structure; C/O columns present the results using control-ownership ratio as measure 
of disproportional ownership structure; The year dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, 
but not reported; p-values are displayed in italics; * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical 




Table 6. The effect of disproportional ownership structure on related party loans 
Variable ORECTA 
 
Wedge Separate  C/O 
C 0.1883  0.1733  0.1550  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  















   
0.0108**  













   
0.9985  
CASHFLOW -0.0011  -0.0012  0.0061  
 
0.9170  0.9127  0.6149  
Founder -0.0151***  -0.0141***  -0.0146***  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
SIZE -0.0126***  -0.0116***  -0.0096**  
 
0.0024  0.0059  0.0206  
ROA -0.1572***  -0.1564***  -0.1595***  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
INDEX -0.0026***  -0.0025***  -0.0026***  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0011  
Adj. R-squared 0.1217  0.1151  0.1142  
    F-stat 14.1863  13.3843  13.2651  
Notes: This Table presents the regression results of the effect of disproportional ownership structure on related 
party loans. Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1. Wedge columns present the results using 
control-ownership wedge as measure of disproportional ownership structure; Separate columns present the 
results using separate dummy as measure of disproportional ownership structure; C/O columns present the 
results using control-ownership ratio as measure of disproportional ownership structure; The year dummies and 
industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported; p-values are displayed in italics; * Statistical 












Table 7. Interaction effect of disproportional ownership and family CEO 
Variable LEV 
 
Wedge Separate C/O 
C -0.8104  -0.8032  -0.8216  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  















   
0.0000  















   
0.0126  
Political 0.0622  0.0606  0.0598  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
CASHFLOW -0.0334  -0.0111  0.0337  
 
0.1635  0.6583  0.2097  
Founder -0.0586  -0.0567  -0.0564  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
TANGI -0.0332  -0.0184  -0.0152  
 
0.1395  0.4112  0.4949  
TAX -0.5718  -0.5558  -0.5789  
 
0.0653  0.0731  0.0602  
SIZE 0.1448  0.1415  0.1406  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
ROA -0.6560  -0.6601  -0.6556  
 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
GROW 0.0019  0.0020  0.0021  
 
0.2392  0.2140  0.1902  
Adj. R2 0.3163  0.3173  0.3255  
    F-stat 50.7139  50.9538  52.8659  
Notes: This Table presents the regression results of the interaction effect of disproportional ownership structure 
and founding-family CEO on leverage ratio. Founder CEO is a dummy variable that equates to 1 if the firm has 
a founding family CEO. Definitions of other variables are reported in Table 1. Wedge columns present the 
results using control-ownership wedge as measure of disproportional ownership structure; Separate columns 
present the results using separate dummy as measure of disproportional ownership structure; C/O columns 
present the results using control-ownership ratio as measure of disproportional ownership structure; The year 
dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported; p-values are displayed in 
italics; * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical 







Figure 1 Jian Long Group taking over Tong Gang Group 
 
 
 
 
